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LEARNING AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
AN EPIGENETIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
Klaus Eder 
 
 
1 Evolution and the Role of the Epigenetic System 
 
The theory of epigenetic developments in evolution rests upon two assumptions. First, 
it refers to developmental processes that decouple biological from genetic evolution. 
Decoupling evolutionary processes from genetic evolution is even more important for 
social evolution. Second, it claims that the development of an organism plays a vital 
role in evolution. It takes into account the specific role individual development plays in 
evolution.   
 
Thus epigenesis refers to definite evolutionary processes unintelligible within 
Darwinian theory (Ho and Saunders, 1982). This special characteristic of epigenetic 
processes restricts the field of random developments in evolution. The Darwinian 
processes of variation and selection are seen as of secondary relevance for evolution to 
take place. The logic of evolution is decoupled from Darwinian logic, which thus loses 
its pre-eminent role in explaining evolutionary sequences.  
 
An epigenetic system that organizes individual development as cognitive learning 
processes (as does the epigenetic system underlying social evolution) changes 
evolutionary processes in several respects. It changes (1) the tempo of evolution (2) the 
internal structures that restrict the relevance of selection processes and (3) the 
conditions that favour learning processes and therefore the innovations that are 
necessary for social evolution. 
 
The central characteristic of social evolution is that society is produced by such 
cognitive learning processes. Learning processes allow for the self-production 
(Touraine, 1973) of society. Of central importance to the process of self-production is a 
special type of cognitive learning, namely moral learning (Fairservis, 1975). Moral 
development emerges in learning processes specific to the human species, and is 
therefore considered to be the key variable in a theory of social evolution (Eder, 1976, 
1984; Habermas, 1981).  
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The Darwinian assumption that epigenesis has to be explained as a by-product of the 
evolutionary mechanisms of adaptation through variation and selection is incompatible 
with the idea of moral development through social evolution. On the contrary, 
evolution on the social level is a by-product of epigenetic processes of cognitive 
development. We claim that the epigenetic system - being itself a by-product or end-
product of evolution on the biological level - to be the primary factor in social 
evolution.1  
 
But this argument against Darwinian theory is still deficient. For it can be argued - and 
this is the theoretical strategy of the behavioral school of sociocultural evolution 
(Langton, 1979) - that the cognitive learning capacity of individual human beings is 
subject to evolutionary processes on the sociocultural level. Starting with such 
individualistic assumptions Darwinian theory cannot be put into question. The 
theoretical implication of this argument is that social evolution is the result of variation 
and selection working directly upon human individuals. Epigenesis is considered to be 
nothing but an obscurantist assumption in the theory of biological and social evolution.  
 
This argument against an epigenetic approach to social evolution can only be refuted by 
showing that the ontogenetic acquisition of cognitive capacities is necessarily a social 
process, that learning on the cultural level is necessarily a collective learning process. 
Only when cognitive capacities are shown to be socially constituted can the argument 
concerning the central role of the epigenetic system in social evolution be defended. 
The central thesis to be defended in the following is therefore that the developing entity 
in social evolution is not the individual, but culture. Culture is the result of the social 
interaction of learning individuals, the result of a collective learning process. Cultural 
development therefore reinforces the epigenetic processes that make social evolution 
possible. The more cultural development advances the less Darwinian theory, and with 
it each variant of individualistic theories of social evolution (Schmid, 1982b), seems to 
be an adequate theoretical strategy.  
 
My thesis about the role of evolutionary theory in the social sciences will be discussed 
in three steps. First, a classical attempt to explain evolutionary change in history 
through genuinely social factors (the Marxian argument) is reconstructed and then 
 
1 The concept of "evolution" is used in its strict meaning: The term evolution refers to stochastic 
processes generated by the mechanisms of mutation and selection. The term epigenesis refers to 
developmental processes, especially to the processes of cognitive and moral development in social 
evolution. Therefore speaking of moral or cognitive evolution is somewhat misleading. 
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reformulated. Second, the idea of a social construction of the cognitive universe is 
discussed using the example of state formation in historical tribal societies in Angola. 
In a third and last section, the theoretical consequences of the axiom of a social 
constitution of learning processes in social evolution and its effects upon a theory of 
social evolution are explored.  
 
 
2 Epigenesis and Evolution in Sociological Theorizing 
 
2.1 Two Old Answers to the Problem of Societal Change 
 
Why do societies change? Marx gives two different answers to this question, and these 
answers still generate competing views on social change. The first answer is that 
societies change because people relate to each other in an antagonistic manner; this is 
the theory of class conflict. The second answer says societies change because they are 
continually forced to adapt their own normative framework to changing environments; 
this is the theory of the structural strain between the productive forces and the social 
relations of production.  
 
These answers lead to mutually exclusive evolutionary theories. The theory of class 
conflict rests on assumptions about collective action generating social change. This first 
answer is epigenetic insofar as Marx assumes the logic of collective action to be the 
logic intervening into social evolution. His second answer is Darwinian because in 
principle the productive forces select - under certain conditions - for specific social 
relations of production. This strain theory is compatible with Darwinian assumptions of 
social systems put under selective pressures in a given environment.   
 
In recent reformulations of the Marxian theory the first answer has gained a new 
significance. In Habermas' reconstruction of Historical Materialism (Habermas 1979) 
the evolution of society is conceptualized as the evolution of the normative structures 
of the system of society. The evolution of normative structures is to be seen as an 
epigenetic process based on an internal logic that is different from Darwinian logic. The 
unsolved problem in this reconstruction of Marx' first answer is how normative 
evolution comes about. Evolution is reduced to a developmental logic of normative 
structures derived from the logic of individual cognitive learning processes. Its 
mechanisms remain unknown; they are to be looked for in "history".  
 
 4 
But this separation of the logic of evolution from the mechanisms of evolution conceals 
the basic nature of this process: that evolution consists of the production of normative 
structures within processes of communication. Normative structures change, not 
because of the cognitive capacities of some individuals, but because there is 
disagreement about normative questions between individuals. This conflict forces those 
tied to different views to communicate and then to learn how to coordinate their 
antagonistic orientations and convictions. The change of normative structures then is 
the result of necessarily collective learning processes (Miller, 1986).  
 
Such a theory of the dynamic aspects of the process of normative evolution pushes an 
epigenetic interpretation of Marx' first answer one step further. The attempt will be 
made to reconstruct class conflicts as collective learning processes and then to 
incorporate the idea of class conflict as the mechanism of social evolution into a 
general theory of social epigenesis.  
 
 
2.2 Some Implications of the Theory of Class Conflict 
 
What is a class conflict? Class conflict implies antagonistic views about what course 
societal development should take, and is thus conflict over the cultural orientation of 
the development of society. Class conflict is the mechanism or, as Marx puts it, the 
motor of historical development. This definition allows for the preliminary distinction 
between two types of societies: into those with and those without class conflict. 
 
Societies without class conflict are societies without history (Lévi-Strauss, 1962). 
Research in social anthropology has given us a series of examples of social structures 
whose historicity has been destroyed. In such cases society can be regarded  as a closed 
system of classification. A society has no history if it is totally classifiable in the terms 
of its own logic. These societies have "forgotten" past antagonisms; they exist in a 
closed cultural universe. An example of a traditional society without historicity is the 
caste society in classical India whose ideal structure was identified by Dumont (1967, 
1970) as being based on the difference between pure and impure. There also are 
examples of modern societies claiming to be based on a stable social structure defined 
by egalitarian principles. Thus socialist societies claiming such a stability can be 
considered to live in such a closed cultural universe.  
 
But the theoretical idea of a closed cultural universe and the related idea of a stable 
social order is based upon an illusion. It reproduces the illusionary image by which 
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society describes itself. This self-description is characterized by the suppression of 
social antagonisms. The theoretical image of a stable society without class conflict 
reproduces an illusory social consensus, one where the official image of a society has 
succeeded in neutralizing opposing unofficial images of itself. In such societies, 
changes can only be be induced from outside, be they demographic changes, changing 
material circumstances, or changes induced by the crisis-ridden logic of the societal 
system itself. In such societies, collective learning processes are necessarily blocked. 
These societies have to "wait" for the "objective laws of history". This critique of a 
certain theoretical image of society holds for primitive societies as well as for 
traditional and modern societies.  
 
This critique implies that class conflict is the normal state of affairs. An adequate 
theoretical image of society has to start with the assumption that societies have a 
history. Society is not a classified and classifiable entity, but an action system within 
which opposing collective actors struggle for the control of the classificatory system. 
This antagonistic situation has been institutionalized historically in at least three 
different ways.  
 
The first is through ritual regulation. Pre-state societies institutionalize class conflict 
in the form of rituals. A collectively shared model of social organization is reaffirmed 
against opposing forces through ritual processes symbolically enacting the 
decomposition and recomposition of the social order. The ritual process is, as Turner 
(1969) puts it, an attempt to establish anti-structure in order to reestablish structure. It is 
a process of negating the negation of structure. Ritual regulation in simple societies 
serves different functions at the same time; it helps to solve quarrels between families 
as well as ecological problems. It regulates interpersonal relations as well as 
environmental relations (Rappaport, 1979, pp. 27-42). But there is a much more 
fundamental aspect to ritual. It is also a mechanism for the reproduction of a social 
structure against the disorder brought about by group conflicts in  the society. Rituals 
function to regulate conflicts between groups in a village and between villages. By 
regulating warfare and thereby reorganizing asymmetries between lineages, rituals 
guarantee social integration on the level of the societal system. Class conflict in pre-
state societies therefore can be said to be regulated by rituals.  
 
The second way class conflict has historically been institutionalized is through 
domination. In premodern state-societies class conflict is controlled by legitimate 
political authority. In these "traditional" societies the continual display of the symbols 
of political authority, especially its hierarchical representation, allows for the regulation 
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of class conflict. When this form of political authority is weakened class relations are 
then defined by the naked use of force to suppress the peasants, a quite unstable 
solution, as the history of classical empires shows. How class conflict is structured in 
traditional societies can be seen in Geertz' analysis of the 19th century Balinese 
kingdoms (1980). The king, called Negara, was the guarantor of an order which bound 
together the antagonistic groups of society. He symbolized the holy order within which 
antagonistic groups struggled for control of power. This symbolic role was 
institutionalized in his official function: to secure the continuity of the ceremonies. That 
the ceremonial context is the field of class conflict in traditional society is also 
emphasized by Sahlins (1981, pp. 67-77). Geertz further argues that it is the symbolic 
universe that gives individual actions of a chief or a commoner their social weight: the 
position of an actor (be he a chief or a commoner) in the culture-as-constituted does 
determine the consequences of his individual actions. In the course of such culturally 
constituted and socially classified collective action the symbolic universe is 
transformed by fitting the intersubjective context to the given objective context. The 
ideal form of such a vertically constructed society has been found in the cultural system 
of hierachy as exemplified in the Indian caste system (Dumont, 1967).  
 
The third way class conflict has historically been institutionalized is through 
permanent class conflict. In modern societies neither ritual nor political authority can 
continue to serve as a social base for class conflict. A new structure is needed for the 
situation where class conflict has become a permanent one. The new institutional form 
is the democratic handling of conflicts, and this implies the self-production of society 
by collective learning processes. This is why modern society is the first society that can 
actually describe itself as a class society (Mousnier, 1974, pp. 13-46; Luhmann, 1984). 
Marx draws a radical conclusion: He conceives class conflict in modern society as class 
struggle. This concept of a struggle presupposes a non-normative concept of class 
conflict that can in fact be found most explicitly in the Darwinian concept of society (to 
which Marx sometimes seems to adhere). But there is also another model of class 
conflict contained in Marx' work. This model is based upon a normative concept of 
what constitutes class relations in modern society (Habermas, 1979). Marx gives some 
hints when he discusses the proletariat organizing a collective learning process in order 
to constitute itself as a class. As a learning collectivity the proletariat uses class conflict 
as the medium of "emancipatory" (in the strict sense of the word) learning processes.  
 
The arguments concerning the theoretical categorization of class conflict are arguments 
for the idea that society produces itself via class conflict, that class conflict defines the 
dynamics of the process of the social self-organization of society. The category of class 
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itself is an empty category; it refers to possible empirical referents of the process of 
social self-organization. In analysing concrete societies this category has to be filled 
with examples. Developmental systems whose dynamics are based upon class conflicts 
are socially structured. But nothing has been said concerning the structural properties of 
the situation called class conflict. To further my argument the structural properties of an 
epigenetic system regulating social evolution by the mechanism of class conflict have 
to be identified.  
 
 
2.3 From the Dynamics to the Logic of Epigenesis 
 
The idea of class conflict developed so far gives some preliminary hints concerning the 
operation of an epigenetic system within the process of social evolution. The next step 
consists of abstracting from the idea of class conflict.  The epigenetic system is to be 
constructed on the level of a general theory of social action. It will be shown that the 
difference between Darwinian and epigenetic assumptions has to do with two 
incompatible theories of action. The first theory conceives social action to be guided by 
the calculation of anticipated profits. The second conceives social action to be 
constituted by communication. The first theory is of a psychological, the second of a 
sociological nature, a difference that Campbell (1975) interprets as a conflict between 
psychology (science) and moral tradition (religion). Psychology is indeed inadequate to 
treat moral traditions scientifically; for here we have to deal with a genuinely 
sociological phenomenon. That leaves us with the question of a science of morals, i. e. 
sociology.  
 
The "action-as-profit" theory (Harris, 1979) assumes that changes in social structure 
are dependent upon solutions of the biological, psychological and ecological problems 
experienced by all human beings and all human cultures. The logic of action is utility: 
People prefer those situations which work to their advantage. Thus in a situation 
characterized at the same time by ecological barriers and growing overpopulation 
where war is a normal consequence, less powerful groups might well elect a 
permanently subordinate status. The benefits of such a status can be said to exceed the 
costs of trying to maintain independence or retreating into ecologically less favorable 
environments. The logic is simple: Benefits and costs are calculated in terms of natural 
needs like hunger, survival etc. Culture is nothing but the collective effect of 
aggregated individual strategic actions. This behavioural theory of action does not 
distinguish between epigenesis and evolution. Individual action is coordinated by 
selective pressures upon individual actions; the logic of coordination is reduced to the 
 8 
logic of selective pressures. The only problem left is to define the selective structures as 
such. In this theory epigenesis is without importance for evolutionary changes. 
Epigenetic assumptions are nothing but a form of obscurantism (Harris, 1979). 
 
The "action-as-communication" theory (Leach, 1976) assumes that social change is 
dependent upon a shared symbolic universe which allows for communication. Symbols 
order the world for the people concerned. Shared interpretations of symbols generate a 
world in which men can communicate with each other. Culture is a shared symbolic 
universe (Geertz, 1973) that allows for the coordination of social action. This theory 
assumes that without the collective construction of a symbolic universe there is no 
object upon which selective pressure can be exerted to produce social evolution. The 
theory therefore separates the development of a shared symbolic universe from the 
evolutionary pressures upon a symbolic universe. Epigenesis then becomes of utmost 
importance in sociocultural evolution.  
 
A behavioural theory of action has no need to know how culture is organized. A 
behavioural analysis analyses nothing but the actual performance of the members of a 
culture. But this observable performance could be a bad performance of a cultural 
script. To go beyond a behavioural theory therefore the plan of culture has to be known. 
Leach gives an illuminating analogy: To know the score of a symphony it is not 
sufficient to observe the performance of that symphony by an orchestra; you also have 
to know the rules that are obeyed by the musicians. The same is valid for culture as a 
whole: To know a culture requires knowing the rules underlying the actions of its 
members (Leach, 1976). This implies looking into the organizing structures of culture 
in order to know the epigenetic logic of social evolution.  
 
The structuralist movement in cultural anthropology has identified some general 
structures of cultural systems. Fundamental to structuring cultural systems is binary 
classification (Lévi-Strauss, 1962), a principle that is characteristic of all cultures. A 
second fundamental rule is ranking (Schwartz, 1981). This relational structure 
underlies the imaginative ordering of nature as well as the normative ordering of 
society in diverse cultures. Whereas binary classification is a cognitive mechanism 
constituent of culture, ranking refers to a cognitive mechanism that allows for vertical 
social classification. Thus ranking articulates more specific differences between forms 
of a social order.  
 
Three general types of ranking underlying social configurations can be distinguished: 
analogical, hierarchical and functional. Each has different structural effects upon the 
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social construction of reality. Analogical ranking is typical for natural communities; 
ranking is here bound to natural roles. Hierarchical ranking is based upon more 
complex images of nature, those that distinguish between the natural  and the 
supernatural through a superordination/subordination relationship. This type of ranking 
sees the social order as the extension of a natural order. Social ranking is based upon 
one's place in a hierarchical and therefore holy order; the idea of caste is the clearest 
case in this respect. Functional ranking sees the social world from "individualist" 
premises. The image of an ordered "supernature" is replaced by the image of 
cooperating individuals. Social ranking is based upon individual rights or individual 
success. The idea of an egalitarian society of free individuals is the ideal type of a 
society organized along these lines.  
 
These different cultural logics are not restricted to the function of organizing cultural 
representations of society. The symbolic structures that make up the different cultural 
worlds are not only created and changed by rules of communication, ideally by rules of 
argumentation (Miller, 1986). They do something much more fundamental: They 
make communication in society possible by regulating a specific property of 
communication, the possibility of saying "no". Communication necessarily produces 
conflicts because people can say "no" to a communication.  This specific property of 
social communication reveals the function of a shared culture: to define a collectively 
shared symbolic world that restricts the possibilities of saying "no" which is the 
precondition for entering into a process of resolving conflicts. Through resolution the 
shared world can be changed and expanded and can serve anew as a reference world 
for future conflicts.  
 
In pre-state societies the logic underlying the resolution of disputes reflects the age, 
personal prestige and status of the parties involved (Gluckman, 1977). Natural 
differences make up the social structure of this type of conflict resolution. A second 
form of handling disputes can be found in hierarchically organized societies, where the 
tacit acceptance of a hierarchy is the cultural presupposition common to those engaged 
in a dispute. The word of the  king has more weight than the word of the peasant. In 
such societies, the appeal to authority is thus the traditional solution to the problem of 
conflict resolution. A third way of resolving conflicts is based upon egalitarian norms. 
They provide the means for a form of conflict resolution that allows for the 
neutralization of inequal status. This is the modern solution to social conflicts.  
 
These three forms of conflict resolution constitute three distinct forms of social order. 
The first can be interpreted as producing a concrete interactive morality underlying a 
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social order, the second an authoritarian one, the third an egalitarian one. From an 
evolutionary point of view these types of morality can be seen as stages of the 
evolution of a social order. The stage-like change of morality can be said to be the 
outcome of an epigenetic process. Social evolution can be said to be bound to a moral 
epigenesis that passes through a pre-authoritarian, an authoritarian and a post-
authoritarian stage of conflict resolution.  
 
This stage theory should not be confused with those stage theories that derive the 
properties of stages from institutional properties (Fried, 1967, 1975; Service, 1975; 
Cohen and Service, 1978). Institutional forms are the time- and space-specific 
realizations of a moral order. They are the result of evolutionary pressures upon moral 
orders and are therefore not indicators of moral stages. Whether or not these epigenetic 
assumptions are necessarily bound to the assumption of a developmental logic 
(Schmid, 1982a) is a problem to be discussed later. That there are normative 
implications in such a theoretical approach cannot be denied.  
 
 
3 Epigenetic Developments and Social Evolution 
 
3.1 Stage Models in Evolutionary Theory 
 
How are epigenetic developments related to evolutionary processes? Epigenetic 
developments are not independent of those evolutionary processes that are defined by 
transformations over time and variations in space. Epigenetic processes cannot be 
separated empirically from Darwinian evolutionary processes.  
 
The Darwinian conception of evolutionary processes does not imply any assumptions 
about stages. The specific evolution of a concrete social system in space and time 
depends upon the internal properties of that specific system and its place within an 
larger natural and social environment. In this sense it is possible to describe the specific 
evolution of a tribal system into a more complex system, that is into a state-society. The 
logic of the epigenetic system is reduced to the logic of the systemic functioning of 
society. Friedman and Rowlands (1982) have made an impressive attempt to do this. 
Using the example of the evolutionary change of a specific type of tribal system they 
start with analyzing the social relations of production and exchange  and try to show 
how internal trends toward increasing complexity over time can either be neutralized or 
differentially selected for by a given structure of the environment.  
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This concept of an epigenetic system forces Friedman and Rowlands to introduce the 
difference between specific evolution (which is epigenetic and local!) and general 
evolution which refers to the development of the spatial system and the structural time 
period within which epigenesis can take place. The logic of general evolution is the 
dominant logic; it is the logic of a system reproducing itself in a larger environment and 
thus being independent of the logic of the epigenetic system. This evolutionary logic 
determines the degree of change necessary given the initial structures of the local 
system in question.  
 
But beyond the degree of transformation is the problem of the very character of this 
transformation. Do the changes in structure allow for collective learning process or not? 
Assuming that human collective action "normally" implies learning processes on the 
part of those engaged in it, we can discriminate between evolutionary changes that 
bring about learning and those that do not. A theory of evolution that overlooks the 
possibility of learning or non-learning as an outcome is forced to subordinate epigenetic 
processes to the factors of space and time that select for transformation. The possibility 
that a society will not learn can never be ruled out. Change in a society that does not 
learn, must be accounted for by selective pressures exerted upon it. Thus an anti-
epigenetic evolutionary theory is limited to accounting for very specific cases: societies 
that do not learn.  
 
There is a real problem inherent in an evolutionary theory that reduces the epigenetic 
system to systemic properties of local systems defined in space and time. It underrates 
the role of learning processes for the evolution of society. The problem how to relate 
epigenetic processes (i.e. learning processes) to evolutionary processes (in the strict 
sense, i.e. of the Darwinian type) in a more productive manner will be treated in the 
following using an example that has become the object of numerous evolutionary 
explanations: the origin and evolution of the state in the history of mankind.2  
 
 
 
2 The literature on state formation is vastly expanding. For some of the more important recent 
literature dealing with this special topic see Wright (1977), Saxe (1977), Claessen and Skalnik 
(1978), Claessen (1978), Skalnik (1978), Cohen (1978), Bloch (1982). 
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3.2 Evolutionary Theory and the Problem of State Formation 
 
The process of state formation can be described as the evolutionary transformation of 
tribal systems into state societies. A "state" implies a normative framework that 
reorganizes on the most fundamental level the kin society, the form of social 
organization typical for pre-state societies. This process has been the subject of diverse 
attempts to construct an evolutionary theory of social change (Fried, 1967; Service, 
1975; Eder, 1976; Claessen and Skalnik, 1978).  
 
Currently, the dominant theory of the formation of the state is based on the cultural 
evolutionist model. This theory starts with the assumption that pre-state societies are 
characterized by an "egalitarian" form of social integration based on kinship relations. 
The kinship structures underlying these relations regulate hereditary succession, access 
to land and water, collective cooperation in the more important economic activities and 
the distribution of goods between and within different descent groups. Intensification of 
production and demographic growth lead to shifts in social organization and to the 
crystallization of the role of "big men" who represent more complex forms of political 
power.  
 
The appearance of big men allows for the institutionalization of functionally specific 
decision-making procedures, procedures which are much more flexible than those 
ordained by any kind of ritual regulation. On the basis of this political power the big 
men can also theoretically accumulate economic power. In order to uphold the old 
equilibrum (based on reciprocity between descent groups) big men are supposed to 
organize redistributive processes. They in fact have to be generous, have to give away 
all their economic power in order to uphold their political power. Should the population 
grow further and cause geogrpahic and/or social circonscription to tighten dissociation 
of political from economic power will lose effect. Under such circumstances the 
generous redistributors can reinforce their political power by transforming voluntary 
contributions to the stock for redistribution into some kind of taxes. On this new 
economic base big men are able to pay a clientele. The big men are transformed into 
warrior chiefs (Sahlins, 1963). While these warrior chiefs are still bound into a 
hierarchically organized kinship structure, they can now mobilize their fellows for 
warfare and raids. Theirs is the power to substitute the small patrilineal groups with 
multi-village military alliances. The role of the warrior chief is the nucleus for the role 
of a king who redistributes only in part those goods he has received by coercion. When 
the role of the king is institutionalized primitive society is transformed into a state 
society.  
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In this model the concept of culture is based upon a naive theory of social action. 
Henderson (1972) has succinctly stated the limitations of this old evolutionary 
paradigm. He sees it as a theoretical simplification which allows for a  
 
systematic concentration upon factors that may be called "external" to individuals: (a) 
social factors, or the constraints imposed by a few major types of socially structured 
situations (economic, political, ritual, etc.), and (b) ecological factors (the relationship 
between technology and environment). By setting all human social behavior within a 
comparable structural framework, and assuming that each actor acts simply to 
maximize his own wealth or power and orders  his learning processes towards this end, 
the scholar may readily direct attention to the social and ecological constraints that 
either produce equilibria within and between groups or else tend to change their 
structures (Henderson, 1972, pp. 3-4).  
 
The theory of action underlying cultural evolutionism is the "action-as-profit" theory. 
From these individualistic premises the social processes leading to state formation 
cannot however be grasped. The normative structures within which strategic action has 
to take place are of no theoretical relevance. Thus the main aspect of the transition from 
pre-state structures to state structures, i.e. the transformation of the structure of the 
social conditions of strategic action, remains hidden. 
 
In the following chapter the evolution from pre-state societies to state societies will be 
analyzed in more detail in an attempt to show how epigenetic developments and 
evolutionary pressures interact. Of special importance will be the attempt to prove the 
relative independence of the epigenetic system (i.e. its development) from adaptive 
pressures (i.e. evolutionary processes). Material from an ethnohistorical study of state 
formation (Miller, 1976) will be used to show how individual actions and the normative 
modes by which they are coordinated are involved in the transformation of social 
systems as basic institutions of society change. This will serve as a starting point for an 
alternative theory of state formation as well as an argument for a radical epigenetic 
approach to social evolution.  
 
 
 14 
4 An Epigenetic Theory of the Formation of the State 
 
4.1 The Historical Formation of Early Mbundu States 
 
The empirical basis of the ethnohistorical account of state formation in Angola from the 
16th to the 18th centuries given by Miller (1976) is oral traditions. This allows Miller to 
speak not only about events, but also about the ideas related to these events. Oral 
history provides better empirical data for the construction of a theory of state formation 
than are usually used in this field. The historical perspective allows Miller to 
reconstruct state formation as a continual give and take of different pre-state political 
institution in the evolution toward a state-like structure. It shows how different groups 
use new political ideas either from their own social context or from an alien context in 
order to construct more cohesive political institutions (hunting groups, ritual groups 
etc.). The decisive historical step is their transformation into states (e.g. kingdoms). 
This process succeeds to a certain extent. It is followed by break-aways from kingdoms 
which are then organized on the basis of differing local conditions. State structures are 
then modified again. 
 
Such an "internalist" explanation of primary and secondary state formation is directed 
against all "externalist" theories of state formation, in this specific case against the 
theory of the Hamitic origins of African states and their "daughter" states explaining 
state formation by migration and conquest by people with higher civilizations. These 
theories have survived in the so-called "Sudanic state hypothesis" (Miller, 1976, pp.4-
11). 
 
Attempting to reconstruct the material of Miller for an evolutionary theory of the social 
origins of the state the following three points are to be stressed: 
 
(1) Political institutions which cut across the lineage base of society were myriad in 
Mbundu pre-state societies. Their functioning depended upon the functioning of the 
basic units: the descent groups which regulated the material life, the land rights, the 
work process, and the distribution of goods within the lineage. 
(2) Authority was conceived in a specific way by the Mbundu, resting on the ability to 
invoke supernatural sanctions. It was not inherent in human beings, but resided in 
authority emblems associated with titles. Authority was an abstraction, independent of 
its living incumbents. Thus authority was dissociated from concrete social relations; it 
has already become an ontological idea. This is to be taken as a criterion for an 
authoritarian morality.   
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(3) The institutional steps toward statehood in Mbundu societies can be seen as a 
process of socially constructing a generalized authority role. First authority is restricted 
to authority over persons other than kinsmen; it operates outside the kin society. Then 
the king himself is made an outsider; he is credited with supernatural (magical) means 
and is given a certain secular institutional backing (slaves). At last the king becomes the 
impartial arbiter between competing lineage groups, basing his power on a legal right. 
The social construction of generalized authority roles follows a developmental pattern 
starting with a chief still being dependent upon his descent group, then moving through 
a theocratic ruler up to a legally defined king.  
 
The first point decribes lineage structure as hampering the development of political 
institutions into more enduring institutions. The descent group is seen here as the great 
conservative factor in political evolution. External factors such as the existence of salt 
pans or ports of trade contribute to the crystallization of more enduring political 
institutions than those typical for the lineage based society. But these "external" factors 
were never strong enough to enable the new political institutions to transform the 
descent structure into a structure better suited to the function of political domination.  
 
For the Mbundu, ngundu, the descent group, was the fundamental mechanism of social 
integration. Kibinda, the hunting society, created links between the ngundu, and 
performed several functions essential to their welfare. On the other hand the kibinda cut 
across the ngundu and was in fact the nucleus for the beginning state formation. The 
structural problem throughout the history of early state formation is the relationship 
between such cross-cutting institutions and the lineage structure of society. 
 
This structural problem is linked to the second point made above. Authority in Mbundu 
society was dependent upon authority titles or emblems: to have authority was to have 
control over an authority emblem. Historically, once a new symbol of authority had 
spread among the Mbundu lineages, individual holders were able to expand their 
personal spheres of influence, thereby appropriating authority over persons not related 
to them by kinship. In Mbundu society the decisive developmental step was the 
structural shift from lunga titles of authority to mavunga titles of authority. Lunga titles 
were hereditary titles, awarded to the lineages by lunga kings. Lunga kings were thus 
under the control of the lineage groups. These titles did no more than reinforce the links 
between descent groups regardless of the physical distance. The lunga concept of an 
authority role was still grounded in concrete interactions.  
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A different concept of authority was introduced with mavunga titles which were 
awarded to persons obliged to perform specialized duties in support of the king and his 
court. Mavunga titles defined for the first time among the Mbundu a social position 
lying outside the control of descent groups. These titles thereby created tensions 
between the lineages and the holders of mavunga titles.  
 
Mavunga structure had its counterpart in the kinguri structure. The kinguri title derived 
from a specific lunga title. Kinguri groups tried to eliminate lineages as the 
organizational backbone of the social structure, and to replace the laws of descent with 
the laws of the kinguri. These laws were intended to hinder the establishment of 
descent relations and in fact forbade childbearing. Children would enter the band only 
through adoption or enslavement and would owe allegiance only to the kinguri. The 
kinguri groups moreover demanded total obedience, seeking thereby to abolish other 
competing titles of authority. This would lead to a centralization of authority in the 
kinguri. Historically, the creation of total power as the basis of kinguri state-building 
failed: The kinguri solution was unacceptable to other chiefs within the reach of the 
kinguri groups. These in fact broke with the kinguri and maintained their authority 
upon other lunga titles. 
 
Both the mavunga and the kinguri images of authority were based more upon master-
servant (or patron-client) relations (Eisenstadt and Roninger, 1984; Eisenstadt and 
Lemarchand, 1982) than upon social relations through descent. They were attempts to 
create a consistent, abstract conception of authority apart from the ngundu descent 
relations. But these concepts lacked the supernatural legitimacy. The realm of the 
supernatural was still in the hands of the diviners, not the authority holders. With the 
rise of the Imbangala kings, who replaced the kinguri type of state system, this 
changed. Historically, the Imbangala kings constructed a universal moral difference 
between themselves and their subjects. The Imbangala kings represented themselves to 
be non-human in contrast to other people who were merely human. These kings ritually 
ate human flesh while forbidding it to non-king individuals. This cannibalism drew on 
analogies which the Mbundu saw between cannibals and carnivores. This ritual became 
the mechanisms of a hierarchical ordering between those with authority and those 
without it.  
 
The early Mbundu states that based their political authority primarily upon lunga titles 
must be described as chiefdoms, because they were dependent upon lineage structures. 
The kinguri states and the Imbangala kilombo crossed this chiefdom level. They were 
theocratic states based upon elaborate rituals in which the symbols of basic social 
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differences (esp. cannibalism or the separation of women from the world of political 
authority) were the elements of a new hierarchical social order.  
 
The third point refers to the institutionalization of authority. The kinguri example 
shows that destroying the lineage structure does not suffice. The kilombo is an 
example of an institutional device that attempted to realize a consistent ideal of 
unquestioned authority. The kilombo was at the outset a circumcision camp, one of the 
many institutions cutting across lineage groups found in the societies of this region. 
This institution was used by Imbangala kings in an effort to establish a non-lineage 
social structure, thereby institutionalizing their hegemony over the Mbundu people. 
The initiation of new members into the kilombo through rituals not connected to 
kinship allowed a radical ideological break with the kin world. With only one 
restriction, that these males not be circumcised, a requirement that qualified all those 
who had not yet undergone circumcision in their own lineages, the Imbangala kings 
were able to attract a considerable manpower. The uncircumcised young men were not 
yet fully socialized Mbundu. They were also young enough to become easily 
indoctrinated into the culture of the kilombo. Using the material and ideological 
ressources of the kilombo gave the Imbangala king double control over his subjects, 
over male society and over the relations with the supernatural. He was not just a chief, 
but a theocratic ruler, fulfilling as well the function of the diviner that traditionally had 
been preserved by designated diviners.  
 
But the kilombo ultimately failed to build up a new infrastructure for society. For to 
reproduce itself it had to rely mainly upon men coming from Mbundu villages. These 
man reintroduced the old Mbundu ideas and structures into the kilombo. The primacy 
of non-kin and non-human liaisons was softened. The Imbangala ideology of non-
humanness and the rigorous conditions of life in the kilombo which differed 
dramatically from the everyday life of the people continually worked against what the 
kilombo was trying to establish. The new cultural system was only partly 
institutionalized; for only the ruling class, not the dominated people, accepted the 
authoritarian morality.  
 
After the dissolution of the kilombo the Imbangala kings took another step in political 
evolution with the help of the Portuguese. Slave trade and legal backing by the 
Portuguese now became the basis of the Imbangala kings. This "external" factor gave 
rise to a new relationship between the Mbundu lineages and Imbangala kings which 
was reinforced by a consonance between the ideology associated with the titles of the 
Imbangala kings and the given Mbundu political system: The kings based their 
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authority upon the lunga titles the Mbundu were accustomed to. The lineages could 
banish the kilombo, but not the cooperation between the Imbangala kings and the 
Portuguese. After the end of the slave trade in the 1850s the balance of power shifted 
again, back from the kings and in favour of the lineages. This was the end of the 
traditional state for the Mbundu.  
 
 
4.2 A Social-Evolutionary Theory of State Formation 
 
The example of the Mbundu shows that the political "moves" of chiefs, leaders etc. are 
bound to a normative framework that puts restrictions on strategic actions. Only within 
a normative context is strategic (or utilitarian) action possible. In order to extend the 
range of possible strategic actions the normative framework must be changed. Seen 
from this perspective the optimum of possible strategic actions is reached when the 
normative context itself is built upon the rules of strategic action. This is the state of 
nature described by Hobbes; it is society free of norms.  
 
This type of evolution is always possible, but it never has a stable outcome. Stable 
solutions to the problem of a normative order of society must be built upon social 
structures that allow for a moral resolution of conflicts. For the Mbundu, such a social 
structure was only partially generated. But such a solution hints to the general 
conditions favouring evolutionary change toward state societies. In the transition from 
simple to more complex societies the evolutionary prerequisite is the substitution of the 
logic of concrete reciprocity by the logic of political domination. Concrete reciprocity 
relies upon natural differences for its own legitimacy. Political domination relies upon 
hierarchical differences. This transition from pre-state societies to state societies 
succeeds because it transforms natural differences into hierarchical differences. Both 
differences are morally justifiable. Whether a social system is grounded upon natural or 
hierarchical differences depends upon what kind of morality socializes it.  
 
Such a perspective implies a reversal of the perspective of classical cultural 
evolutionism. A big man is not transformed into a warrior chief because social changes 
give him the strategic chance to accumulate power. A big man becomes a warrior chief 
because people redefine a social situation in such a way that his social role can be 
played differently: as that of a ruler. The social situation is defined no longer by the 
logic of concrete reciprocity, but by the logic of political domination. This redefinition 
implies a complementary redefinition of the role of the people: They become the 
subjects of a ruler. But why do people change their definition of what they regard as the 
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right state of affairs? What makes people change their mind in such a way that culture 
can be completely reversed?  
 
The conjectural causes that set into motion or inhibit this process are to be described as 
factors external to the social actions of the people concerned. External circumstances 
that select for evolutionary change are a necessary condition of such a change. Pressure 
from the external material environment is necessary in order to set structural 
redefinitions into motion. Such a situation is identical with what Marx understood as 
the crisis of a mode of production. According to this theory, the formation of the state 
presupposes a crisis of the "neolithic" mode of production. Such a crisis can be 
described as the inability of the kinship structures to solve the problem of distributing 
the goods produced in a society. Insofar as kinship ties can no longer serve as an 
institutional frame for systemic reproduction, changes in the system become necessary.  
 
Beyond these conjectural causes that function as selective mechanisms in an 
evolutionary process, some internal conditions on the cultural level also need to be 
fulfilled. They can serve as starting points for attempts to redefine the normative 
framework within which a society can be reproduced, especially solve its distributional 
problems.  
 
Such conditions can be shown to function in the legal and religious field in the 
transition to state societies. In egalitarian systems the legal function is integrated into 
the ritual complex (Koch, 1974). Chiefs have the right to act as arbiters. They even may 
have the right to sanction. But the only difference between the vengeance of the chief 
and that of any other person is that the vengeance of the chief is more cruel. Neither 
right is therefore specific to the chief. In stratified societies the legal function becomes 
more specific. In the kingdoms of the Shanti, Barotse, etc. we find judicial courts which 
are the property of chiefs or kings (Gluckman, 1977). But the chief or king is himself 
restricted to a symbolic function. While domination is accepted on a religious plane, the 
king is powerless on the legal plane; the legal function (sanction) is taken over by 
representatives of the king. This is an ambivalent solution that makes concessions to a 
concrete social morality, but also contains elements of an authoritarian morality of law 
and order. Only after the king is defined as the final judge can authority and domination 
be institutionalized (Eder, 1976). 
 
This development of the legal culture has repercussions in the development of the 
religious belief system. The gods become masters of destiny; they are no longer the 
objective causes of the fate of the people. The gods become guardians of justice; they 
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are no longer merely the guardians of the objective order of the world.  New gods of 
law supersede the old chthonic gods of the archaic world. These new gods represent a 
new cultural logic, that of a hierarchical moral order. The cultural changes produce a 
new developmental system which is the starting point for the further social evolution of 
the social system of society. The legal and religious definitions of hierarchy imply a 
reorganization of the internal environment, of the epigenetic system of culture.  
 
Such cultural change can be interpreted as a learning process. Learning processes are 
on the one hand processes by which the objective world is cognitively appropriated. As 
such they allow for the cognitive assimilation of external pressures upon action. But the 
result of learning processes such as new technical inventions also pose new problems 
for the reproduction of social systems. They force the moral infrastructure of society to 
readjust. Such a cognitive interpretation of cultural development as a learning process 
has already been proposed by Fairservis (1975) and others.  
 
The "external systemic environment" contains the conditions that favour possible 
evolutionary changes. The "internal cultural environment" contains models for a social 
order. Each of these environments is behind one of two competing evolutionary 
theories, one an objectivist theory that explains the social forms of communication 
through selective pressures at work in society, and the other a subjectivist theory that 
explains the products of these social forms through an innate progressivism in 
humanity. The controversy between the two is wrong and misleading. In the first case, 
culture appears as a superstructure, representing reality more or less. In the second case 
culture determines social evolution. Both approaches are inadequate, however, because 
they each fail to take into account the interactive relation between culture and social 
form. Culture is socially produced, and in this process of social production society 
produces itself. In this process of self-production external factors may intervene and 
produce a social system determined by space and time.  
 
The topological image of base and superstructure is also misleading. There is neither a 
special logic to the system of social relations (of production or distribution etc.) nor one 
to the system of cultural symbols, be they of religious or secular nature. But the 
Marxian tradition provides an alternative image to this misleading one: the image of 
class conflict as the motor of history, as the mechanism of social evolution. This image 
covers the idea expounded above exactly: Class conflict is at the same time a conflict 
concerning the cultural orientation of societal development and a social relationship 
that relates classes of people with each other. Class conflict is a mechanism that 
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changes (if there is change at all) cultural orientations as well as the social context 
within which classes relate to each other.  
 
This brings us nearer to an answer to the question of why people change their moral 
outlook. How can we explain the learning processes that react to external influences 
and at the same time produce a different cultural universe? This question can be 
answered with the concept of collective learning processes. For when moral questions 
are at stake, people have to communicate with each other, they have to enter into social 
relations, and this creates a reflexive mechanism. In trying to learn, people create a 
social universe within which to organize their learning processes. And they create 
social contexts that cut acrosss the established forms of social relationships. Such 
leveling social forms (e.g. religious rituals or hunting societies in pre-state societies) are 
therefore marginal with respect to the dominant social environments (e.g. kinship 
institutions in pre-state societies). As they are used in handling moral disputes social 
forms become constitutive conditions for their resolution. In some cases this handling 
breaks apart the social form in which it takes place. These are the historical situations 
where new forms of social relations are invented.  
 
Thus the class of people communicating in ritual hunting societies and the class of 
people communicating in kin communities represent antagonistic cultural orientations 
and contexts of communication. But as soon as these contexts enter into relation with 
each other a dynamic is set into motion that changes the the cultural legitimacy of 
social forms of communication that have so far been uncontested. Learning has no need 
for externally induced dynamics: Already, before selective pressure comes in, the social 
world is in the state of epigenetic evolution.  
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
The concept of epigenesis has a well-defined status in the theory of biological 
evolution. It refers to organic developmental processes that decouple biological 
evolution from genetic evolution. These processes are supposed to exert an autonomous 
role in evolution. Epigenesis on the social level does the same: It decouples social 
evolution from organic evolution. This is why this concept has been used to construct a 
theory of evolution that takes into account the properties of social evolutionary 
processes (themselves evolutionary emergent).  
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It has also been shown that the individualistic assumptions underlying the biological 
conception of epigenesis are a block to an adequate understanding of social evolution. 
Therefore the idea of an epigenetic developmental system governing evolution has been 
expanded into one that could better be called an epiorganic system governing social 
evolution. Social evolution is characterized by the fact that it has become possible to 
disconnect cultural development from individual learning. There is no requirement that 
all individuals learn. It is sufficient that they communicate. Through the process of 
communication some learn and thereby redefine the collective knowledge and 
consciousness of society. In this sense the specific characteristic of social evolution is 
that society learns. This often contested Durkheimian idea is to be defended against all 
forms of individualistic reductionism.  
 
There are only two assumptions behind the theoretical idea of a socio-cultural 
epigenesis: that disputes over moral questions are normal and that the resolution of 
disputes implies communication. As such this theoretical ideal can be formulated in a 
parsimonious manner similar to the old neo-Darwinian theory. Progessivist 
assumptions are not needed. Therefore the classic objections to applying epigenetic 
approaches in theories of social evolution are unwarranted. 
 
Our theory of an epigenetic evolution thus changes the function that the idea of 
variation and selective retention can have on the socio-cultural level. It also modifies 
the function that the idea of a developmental logic (leading to an end state) can have on 
social evolution. For these ideas are themselves descriptions of social evolution that 
fulfill different functions. As the idea of socio-cultural selection, Darwinism is an 
attempt to relate the status of a society in the international system of societies to its 
competitive strength. As the idea of a developmental logic in history, progressivism is 
an attempt to mark off the distance between the past and the present in terms of 
primitive versus modern and thus to evaluate the status one society has vis-à-vis 
another.  
 
As soon as these theoretical positions are disputed the social context changes. Once 
these positions are seen as self-descriptions of society, the vantage point for observing 
the system also changes. The position of the Darwinist or the Progressivist has become 
obsolete. For we have learned that these are nothing but possible ways of looking at 
society. They have become antagonistic ways of society looking at itself. Society - after 
the disillusioning experiences with its classical theoretical self-descriptions - has to 
reorganize its description of itself. When we try to observe this new antagonistic 
reflection we are left with the sole idea that what we observe is nothing but the 
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collective learning process in which we as the observers also take part. What we 
observe is nothing but the "autopoiesis" of society in a collective learning process in 
which we take part. 
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